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中文摘要
廠商的總除污邊際成本對一國政府的最適
貿易關稅以及環境污染稅的選擇，有很重
大影響。本文研究發現，當總除污邊際成
本呈現向下斜曲線時，則如果政府調高進
口關稅，其最適環境污染稅也必定要跟著
調高。另一方面，當總除污邊際成本呈現
向上斜曲線時，則如果政府調高環境污染
稅，其最適進口關稅就必須要跟著調高。
關鍵詞：污染控制，最適環境政策，污染
排放稅，進口關稅，庫諾競爭
Abstract
A firm’s total marginal cost, which is
the abatement cost minus the pollution tax
payment reduction per unit of abatement
investment, plays an important role for a
country’s trade policy and environmental
policy.  If the total marginal cost function
slopes downward, the optimal emission tax
rate increase when the government increases
its import tariff.  On the other hand, if the
total marginal cost function slopes upward,
the optimal import tariff increases when the
government increases its emission tax rate.
Keywords: pollution control, optimal
environmental policy, emission tax, import
tariff, Cournot competition
1.  Introduction
Under international competitive
framework, several papers have done a great
contribution.  The frontiers of this issue go
to Markusen (1975) and Krutilla (1991).
They points out that the tariff will distort
away form the optimality when there exists
emission tax.  Similarly, when a county
imposes a tariff, the equilibrium emission
tax will not be optimal.1  Copeland (1994),
assuming a small open economy, shows the
requirements to keep the social welfare
unchanged when either tariff or emission tax
changes.2
Hung (1994) studies the issue under an
imperfect competitive international
framework.  He assumes two countries,
with one firm being located in each.  To
grab a larger market share, the government
will lower its emission tax on the domestic
firm, which results in a welfare loss.
Ludema and Wooton (1994) assumes only
the home country consumes the polluting
goods, and find that the foreign country will
set a higher emission tax in order to
persuade the home country to lower its
import tariff.  When the pollution is
crossing border, Copeland (1996) proves
that the home country will set a high tariff to
reduce the output of the foreign country
even though the foreign country has been
imposing a higher emission tax rate.
In Perroni and Wigle (1994), empirical
studies find that tariff does not influence a
country’s environmental policy.  However,
in Indonesia case, Lee and Roland-Holst
(1997) using CGE model, proves that
international trade may lead to an increase in
pollution, depending on the choice of the
emission tax.
                                                
1 Krutilla advances the results, and finds that the
emission tax is suboptimal under the consideration of
tariff.
2 Others under competitive framework are such as
Conrad (1993), Kennedy (1994), and Simpson and
Bradford (1996)
2In this paper, the home country initially
has a polluting oligopoly industry, facing a
foreign firm importing the same good.  A
three-stage game model is set up.  The
government first chooses the import tariff (t)
on the foreign firm as well as the emission
tax rate (t) on the domestic firms, then the
domestic firms choose their abatement
investment level (a1 and a2 for each), finally
the all firms in the country choose their
output level (qi, i = 1, 2, 3).  This setting
differs from the existing literature in several
folds.  First, the home country industry is
initially in an oligopoly market.  This will
change the competitive behaviors from a
single firm in the country.  Second, the
domestic firms need also choose their
abatement investment.  The
interdependence of a domestic firm’s output
and abatement investment can be also
clarified under the influence of tariff and
emission tax.  Third, the home country
chooses both the domestic emission tax and
the import tariff, different from those papers
concerning the foreign country’s export
tariff.
2.  The Model
The government choice of the two
policies occurs in the first period.  In the
second period, given the government
policies, the domestic firms decide the
investment of pollution abatement (a1 and a2
for each).  The investment, including all
kinds of effort and physical inputs for
abating pollution, ensues the abatement cost
c(ai) of per unit of product.
3  With this
investment, part of the emitting pollutant
through producing one unit of good is
abated, and only the amount e(ai) remains.
Assume that c¢(ai) > 0, c²(ai) > 0, c²¢(ai) = 0,
e¢(ai) < 0, e²(ai) > 0, and e²¢(ai) = 0.  Let
x(ai) = c(ai) + te(ai).  It is obvious under
                                                
3 To include marginal production cost, we can write
the marginal cost function as c(qi, ai).  In this paper,
we assume the marginal production cost as a constant,
which is normalized at zero.  The function c(ai) is
just the marginal abatement cost.
our assumption that x²(ai) > 0, and x²¢(ai) =
0.
For simplification of analysis in the
three-stage game, we will assume the
domestic demand function exhibits a linear
form: P(Q) = 1-Q, where Q is the market
output.  Each domestic firm thus has its
profit function as the following:
.2,1  ),()()(
,)()1(
=-=
--=
iaeacaxwhere
qaxqQ
iii
iii
i
t
p
The profit function for the foreign firm on
the other hand takes the following form:
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3.  Equilibr ium behaviors
In the third stage, the three firms, two
domestic firms and one foreign firm,
Cournot-competes in home country.
Solving for the equilibrium qi, we have
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By calculating the comparative statics, we
can build our first Proposition:
Proposition 1.  The domestic quantity will
increase while the import quantity will
decrease if one of the following conditions
occurs:
(a) The import tariff increases;
(b) The emission tax increases;
(c) The abatement investment increases and
the marginal tax payment reduction is
smaller than marginal abatement cost.
In the second period, the domestic firms
choose their own abatement investment
levels.4  To derive the comparative statics,
we calculate the determinant D of the
Jacobian matrix:
                                                
4 With abuse of the notation, keep in mind that the
notation qi hereafter represents the third-stage
equilibrium quantity.  That is, it takes the form: qi =
qi(a1, a2, t, t), i=1, 2, 3.
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By Cramer rules, we can obtain:
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Proposition 2 is thus build:
Proposition 2.  A lower import tariff or a
higher emission tax will induce a higher
abatement investment of a domestic firm.
4. Optimal government policy
In the first stage, the government would
choose its policies to maximize social
welfare, which denoted as W is composed of
domestic firms’ profits, tax revenues,
pollution damages, and consumer surplus:
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where d represents the damage measure of
the emitting pollutants.  The first-order
conditions turn out to be:
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By some arrangement and calculations,
we build the following Proposition:
Proposition 3.  If 0>¢x and )q(ex 1+¢¢ -
2
3
1 x¢ >0, then a higher emission tax rate
causes a higher import tariff.
When the total marginal cost function
exhibits convexity with a relatively large
curvature, ie., when x¢2/x² is smaller, the unit
abatement investment increase will cause a
bigger total marginal cost of a firm.  If the
government increases its emission tax rate, it
will cause a domestic firm to increase its
abatement investment, and then decrease its
output.  The industry profit is lost to the
foreign firm, and the industry price increases,
dissipating the consumer surplus.  A tariff
increase can force the foreign firm return its
profit gain, and thus enhance the social
welfare.
Similarly, following the way deriving
proposition 3, we can obtain the following
Proposition:
Proposition 4.  If x¢ < 0, -¢+¢¢ xxq13
2x¢
< 0, and q1+ d +  t is sufficiently large, then
a higher import tariff will push the emission
tax rate higher.
When import tariff increases, marginal
cost of the foreign firm increase, the
domestic firms then enjoy a larger market
share.  To grab the chance of profit increase,
the firms should cut their abatement
investment.  However, more abatement
investment means more total marginal cost
savings due to x¢ < 0, benefiting the social
welfare.  Therefore the government will set
a higher emission tax rate to force firms put
a higher abatement investment.
The damage measure plays a role for
influencing the optimal emission tax when
the import tariff changes.  Its reasoning is
similar to the above.
5. Conclusions
With specific linear demand, this paper
finds that some findings are coincidental
with the traditional wisdom, while some turn
out to be different form the existing
literature.
When the government decides its import
tariff on the foreign firm ass well as the
emission tax rate on the domestic firms, they
are interdependent.  If the total marginal
cost slopes upward, i.e., if the tax payment
reduction is less than the expenditure per
unit of abatement investment, the import
tariff will also rise if the government sets a
higher emission tax rate, in order to prevent
the foreign firm from stealing the welfare
4gain.  On the other hand, when the total
marginal cost function slopes downward, i.e.,
when the tax payment reduction is greater
than the expenditure per unit of abatement
investment, the government will also
increase its emission tax rate if it increase
the import tariff, to prevent the domestic
firms from cutting their abatement
investment, with more of which reducing
more emission, and benefiting the society
more.
Moreover, if the total marginal cost
slopes downward, the increase of abatement
investment will increase the domestic firms’
outputs, and will decrease the foreign firm’s
output on the contrary.
The increase of emission tax rate will
always decrease a domestic firm’s output,
but increases the foreign firm’s output.  On
the contrary, the increase of import tariff
always increases the domestic firms’ outputs,
while decreases the foreign firm’s output.
Moreover, we observe that the abatement
investment will increase when the emission
tax rate increases, or when the import tariff
decreases.
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